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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
support, and when insurance can be obtained to cover nearly every
risk,54 public policy will no longer allow protection of the hospital
or blood bank because of their "humane" function at the expense of
the innocent consumer. North Dakota and other states have pro-
claimed policy by legislating against implied warranties on the
"sale" of blood, but they cannot prevent the oncoming trend of
strict liability protection to the defenseless consumer.
ROBERT A. KEOGH
CRIMINAL LAW - RIGHT TO COUNSEL - MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE
VIOLATORs-The indigent respondent was arrested for disorderly
conduct, a violation of the Police Code of the City of Portland. A
plea of not guilty was entered. The respondent was not advised by
the municipal court that if he was unable to employ counsel, the
court would appoint counsel to represent him. After respondent was
convicted and sentenced to six months in jail, he filed a petition for,
and was granted a writ of habeas corpus by the circuit court of
Multnomah County. Appeal was taken by the officer responsible for
his custody, who claimed that a person charged with a municipal or-
dinance violation had no constitutional right to court appointed
counsel. The Supreme Court of Oregon, one judge dissenting, held
that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well
as the Oregon Constitution extended the right to counsel to mis-
demeanants, including those accused of violating municipal ordinanc-
es. The court further stated that no person may be deprived of his
liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel as so guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment. Stevenson v. Holzman, --- Ore.-,
458 P.2d 414 (1969).
The Oregon Supreme Court relied primarily on the language of
the Sixth Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'
This constitutional right was first made applicable to the states
upon the Citadel (Strict LAability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1959). Pros-
ser !otes that the public outcry has been greatest in food cases, and that extension of
this policy to other produdts will depend upon probable danger, frequency of injury, and
reasonable public expectation. The rule of strict tort liability as set out by the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment M (1965), does not depend on the laws of
contract or sale. The seller Is, strictly liable for his defective products whether there has
been a representation or not. Rather than proceed in warranty, it would seem simpler to
regard the liability of the Blood Bank as one of strict liability in tort. See generally
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,, Inc., 57 Cal. 2d 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) ; Henning-
son v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
54. See VANCE, INsURANCE § 6 (3d ed. 1951) ; cf. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 141 (1952) ; 15
Am. JUR. 2d Charities § 154 (1964).
1. U. S. CoNST. amend. VI.
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in capital cases in Powell v. Alabama,2 then applied on a case
by case standard to the states in Betts v. Brady.8 Subsequently
this right was made binding upon the states in all cases of serious
offenses in Gideon v. Wainwright,4 where Justice Douglas stated:
[Alny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.5
The application of that statement was limited by Justice Harlan in
concurrance, who assured that Gideon should not be given full ap-
plication to state proceedings, but should be applied only to cases
which ". . . carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence. ' '6
The Supreme Court has reinforced Justice Harlan's limited interpre-
tation of Gideon by denying certiorari in at least three cases ap-
plying to misdemeanants and the right to counsel. 7 Justice Stewart
favored certiorari in Winters v. Beck" to clarify the scope of
Gideon, and to see that the Court fulfilled the duty to apply a vital
guarantee of the United States Constitution evenly in all states, rath-
er than making the determination depend on arbitrary felony or mis-
demeanor classifications.
The most notable extension of the right to counsel in a state
court prior to Stevenson was the Minnesota decision of State v.
BorstA In Borst, the right to counsel was granted to all indigent
misdemeanants who faced a potential jail sentence. The Minnesota
Court based their decision upon their supervisory powers over the
administration of justice, and not on any constitutional grounds.-
This position was taken because: the United States Supreme Court
had not yet given an answer on the matter; the states were
in hopeless confusion regarding the classification of acts as mis-
demeanors or felonies; and the results of similar cases in other
jurisdictions varied widely. 1
2. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
3. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).
5. Id. at 344.
6. Id. at 351 (Harlan, J. concurring).
7. DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966) ; Cortinez v. Flournoy, 385 U.S. 925
(1966) ; Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
8. Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907, 908 (1966). "No State should be permitted to re-
pudiate those words [referring to the language " . . . any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 344 (1963)] by arbitrarily attaching the label
'misdemeanor' to a criminal offense." Id. at 908, where a footnote indicates that in Ar-
kansas, some misdemeanors are punishable by up to three years imprisonment.
9. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
10. Id. at 894.
11. Id. at 892-93. See also the following cases granting misdemeanants the right to
counsel: McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106, (5th Cir. 1966) (Containing dicta, however, at
108 that traffic offenses should be excluded.); Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263, (5th
Cir. 1965) ; Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Sup. 1049 (D. Miss. 1969) (deals with juveniles.) ;
Rutledge v. Miami, 267 F.Supp. 885 (S.D. Fla. 1967); In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 606, 427
P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967); State v. Collins, 278 Minn. 437, 154 N.W.2d 688
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In the present case, the Oregon Court failed to equate the right
to counsel to that of a jury trial, yet pointed out that the Su-
preme Court had very recently affirmed the denial of a jury trial
in petty offense cases.12 However, the Oregon Court alluded to the
distinction made in Borst that the right to counsel is more essential
to a fair trial than is the right to a jury:
It is conceivable that a fair trial may be had before an impar-
tial judge without a jury, but it is hardly conceivable that a
person ignorant in the field of law can adequately defend
himself without the assistance of counsel. Consequently, we
do not consider the cases involving the right to a jury trial
controlling in this area.13
The non-application of the petty offense rule to all constitu-
tional guarantees was emphasized by reliance on a recent decision
of the Supreme Court, where the denial of a transcript of the
municipal court proceedings at public expense to an indigent con-
victed of drunken driving was found to be a denial of equal pro-
tection as guaranteed by the Constitution.1 4 For this reason the
present court relied on language from Gideon to reinforce the ideal
that counsel is required for ". . . every step in the proceedings
against him . . .. ,,5 including the right to counsel. The Oregon
Court states as its policy: "The assistance of counsel will best
avoid conviction of the innocent-an objective as important in the
municipal court as in a court of general jurisdiction."16
The Oregon Court placed secondary reliance upon two older
Federal decisions, 7 which state that counsel should be provided in
all cases, regardless of the length of potential loss of liberty." The
Oregon Court fails to recognize, however, that since these cases
were decided, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 has been codified, 9
which requires appointed counsel only for indigents charged with
(1967) ; State v. Illingsworth, 278 Minn. 434, 154 N.W.2d 678 (1967). Contra, Brinson V.
State6 269 F. Supp. 7471 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (traffia offense); Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark.
1151, 297 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); State v. McCrowe, 272
N.C. 523, 158 S.E.2d 337 (1968); Hendrix v. Seattle, - Wash. 2d- , 456 P.2d 696
(1969).
12. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969). In this case the court found the de-
termining factor upon which to classify an offense as petty or serious should be the
severity of the penalty authorized, and where no maximum penalty is authorized, the
severity of the penalty actually imposed should be determinative. Quaere how the latter
standard can be applied prospectivly. Nevertheless, the Court referred to Congress' deter-
mination that petty offenses are those misdemeanors which do not carry a penalty ex-
ceeding six months imprisonment or a fine of $500 or both, as announced in the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
13. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967).
14. Williams v. Oklahoma, 395 U.S. 4.58 (1969).
15. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372, U.S. at 345 (1963).
16. Stevenson v. Holzman, - Ore. at- , 458 P.2d at 418 (1969).
17. Johnson v. Zerbst, 30-4 U.S. 458 (1938); Evans v., Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463, 467 (1938) ; Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d at 618
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
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other than petty offenses in the Federal Courts. A petty offense has
been defined as any offense carrying a maximum penalty of less
than six months imprisonment and/or a $500.00 fine.20 While the
court did not specifically refer to the language of James v. Headley,21
a 1969 decision, they did mention the case. James considered the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 to set standards for determining when
counsel should be compensated in Federal Courts, and not a limita-
tion of fundamental constitutional rights.22 This view is further
supported by a reading of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 44, which extends the right to counsel to all criminal pro-
ceedings.23
The dissent in Stevenson considered the adoption of Rule 44 of
the Federal Rules to be one of public policy, and not grounded on
any constitutional right,2 4 because the Federal Rule was adopted
only after arrangements for funding had been provided. The dis-
sent also took issue with the majority reliance on the Oregon con-
stitutional provision25 and interpreted that provision as applying
only to felony cases tried in the circuit courts of the state, and not
to courts of inferior jurisdiction. 26
The Stevenson decision is contrary to a recent Washington Su-
preme Court decision2 7 where the court ruled that while everyone
may have a right to counsel, they do not necessarily have a right
to counsel at public expense when charged with a misdemeanor in
municipal court. The court stated:
Perhaps ours would be a better society if the right to have
counsel implied a corresponding duty in the state to supply
counsel, but the constitutions now in force contain no such
apparent mandate and impose the duty on the state only
in prosecutions for felonies. 28
The Washington Court refused to stretch beyond the felony rule
for the right to appointed counsel by citing numerous Supreme
Court cases recognizing the right to counsel only in felony proceed-
ings.2 9 The Washington Court reinforced its finding by alluding to
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
21. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
22. Id. at 331.
23. FED. R. CaiM. P. 44(a). "The right to and assignment of counsel is made available
to every defendant unable to secure counsel." The note of the Advisory Committee states
that this amended rule extends the right to counsel to petty offenses to be tried in the
district courts and to defendants unable to secure counsel for reasons other than finan-
cial.
24. Stevenson v., Holzman, -Ore. at-, 458 P.2d at 419 (1969).
25. ORE. CoNsT, art. I, § 11 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right . . . to be heard by himself and counsel; . . ."
26. Stevenson v. Holzman, -Ore. at-, 458 P.2d at 420 (1969).
27. Hendrix v. Seattle, -Wash. 2d-, 456 P.2d 696 (1969).
28. Id. at 703.
29. Id. at 701-02.
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the argument that if a right to counsel is recognized for so-called
petty offenses and municipal ordinance violations, our system of in-
ferior courts would lose their effectiveness to handle large volumes
of judicial business at a minimum cost and delay. The court extend-
ed this reasoning by stating that through granting the right to coun-
sel, a snowballing effect would result. The Washington Court feared
that the indigent defendant would also be entitled to the rights to
clinical and psychiatric examinations, court reporters, and investi-
gation capabilities, a cost and burden which could unduly hamper
and compound the effectiveness of these inferior courts as well as
the entire system of justice.30
The Washington Court, as well as the dissent in Stevenson,
reasoned that if an indigent felt he did not have a fair trial he could
always appeal, and the appellate court could direct appointment of
counsel for the indigent. 31 This rationale seems to beg the question,
because if the interests to be served are those of the defendant,
could they not be served better by seeing that the injustice never
occurred in the first place, rather than correcting any prejudicial
errors on appeal? The appeal argument is also weakened because
of the lack of a record from such inferior courts, and the handicap
under which an attorney must operate who enters the case only
on appeal, with no record of prior proceedings to rely upon.
After the Stevenson decision had been handed down, the question
of the right to counsel in municipal courts arose in North Dakota via
an inquiry to and subsequent opinion rendered by the Attorney
General. 32 That opinion pointed out that under section 29-07-01.1 of
the North Dakota Century Code (Supp. 1969) an indigent defen-
dant charged with a violation of a state criminal law may have
counsel appointed by the court, the cost to be incurred by the county
wherein the offense took place. The Attorney General believed that
the emphasis on "state criminal law", as well as the provision for
payment by the county made it clear that such statute should not
apply to municipal ordinance violations. The opinion pointed out in
contrast that because another code section makes municipal court
proceedings governable by state law concerning justice court pro-
ceedings,3 3 section 29-07-01.1 could also be applied to municipal
courts. The North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized that cer-
tain city ordinances may be criminal in nature, 34 thus no semantic
obstacle appeared to prevent the appointment of counsel for an
indigent city ordinance violator by the municipal judge based on
30. Id. at 709-10.
31. Id. at 711.
32. Op. N. D. ATT'Y GEN. (Nov. 17, 1969).
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-11 (1968).
34. Minot v. Whitfield, 71 N.W.2d 766 (N.D. 1965).
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state law. The Attorney General refrained from stating whether or
not a city judge may or may not make such appointment of
counsel, because apparently one city judge in the state (identity
unknown) had already done so, and thus the Attorney General felt
he should avoid comment on an act by a member of the judiciary.
In the absence of a state statute, state supreme court decision, or a
United States Supreme Court decision on the matter, the Attorney
General ruled that no duty exists on the part of a municipal judge
to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant. However, he implied
that such appointments may be permissively made until it is judicial-
ly determined to the contrary.
North Dakota has authorized the imposition of a maximum sen-
tence of 30 days in jail and a $500.00 fine in any of the municipal
courts of the state.35 While the preceeding statute purports to
establish a limit of a 30 day jail sentence in the municipal courts,
in effect the municipal courts may effectively sentence a convicted
person for up to 3 months for any one offense.36 This result is
possible pursuant to the "work-off" provisions allowing persons to
work off their unpaid fines at $5.00 per day while in jail.3 7 Thus,
a relatively long jail term by nearly any person's standards is pos-
sible in the municipal courts.
In the absence of any state court determinations as to the right
to counsel for indigent city ordinance violators, it seems that the
serious crime classification of six months imprisonment will impose
a limitation on effective sentencing without the right to counsel.
This limitation will result from the recent decision of Winters v.
Beck, 8 and will at least be applicable in the Eighth Circuit. In
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-06 (Supp. 1969).
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-12 (1968).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 4,0-11-12 (1968).
38. Winters v. Beck, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark. 1968), affd, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
Winters, an indigent, had been convicted of immorality, a misdemeanor under the
provisions of a Little Rock city ordinance. The municipal court fixed punishment at 30
days in Jail and assessed a fine of $254.00. Because of his indigency, he was unable to
pay the fine and thus pursuant to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2416 (1956) was sentenced to
the County Penal Farm for 284 days. He did not ask, nor was he Informed by the trial
judge of a right to counsel. After his time for appeal to the county' court had expired be-
cause of ignorance regarding his appropriate remedies, he did secure counsel who filed,
and wast denied a writ of habeas corpus by the Little Rock municipal court, and the Pu-
laski Circuit Court. The Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently denied his petition, Win-
ters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), finding no duty imposed on a trial
couirt to appoint counsel for a defendant charged with a misdemeanor. This denial was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and certiorari was denied. Winters v. Beck,
385 U.S. 907 (1966).
Winters, however, perfected a later petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the
United States District Court, Winters v. Beck, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark. 1968), where
the court held that the definition of a, petty offense (in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964), is any
misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for six months or a
fine of more than $500.00 or both), should apply in this case, and thus the charge in this
case did not opnstitute a serious offense. The conviction was found to be invalid, how-
ever, based on the interaction of the Arkansas work-off statute previously cited, and the
$254.00 fine imposed. The court found that the combination of the punishment in this case
pursuant to the statute did constitute a serious offense, and that the failure of the court
to appraise the defendant of his rights to counsel did constitute a constitutionally invalid
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Winters the United States District Court ruled that the interplay of
the Arkansas work-off statute with the combined jail sentence and
fine brought the sentence within the serious crime classification
referred to in Gideon. Because the serious crime classification re-
sulted, the conviction was ruled invalid following the unconstitu-
tional denial of the right to counsel.3 9 Based on this decision, and
considering the subsequent history of the case, it must be accepted
that even under the application of the work-off statutes, the maxi-
mum sentence which can be imposed in any court without the
right to counsel is imprisonment of six months.
An additional element which makes trial without the benefit of
counsel troubling in North Dakota municipal courts is that the
municipal judge need not have any legal training in cities of under
3,000 people.40 Even in cities of over 3,000 a layman may act as
municipal judge if no attorney is available to perform the func-
tion .4 1 Thus, the indigent city ordinance violator, often a stranger
in the community, finds himself not only denied the assistance of
counsel, but also appearing before a municipal judge who is per-
haps not familiar with the rules of evidence, burdens of proof, or
rules of law applicable to any particular case. To further hamper
the rights of the accused, the judge is often well acquainted with
the local police because both are residents in a frequently small
community (and perhaps even lifetime friends), factors further
tending to promote belief of the police officer and utter disbelief of
the accused. 42
An example of the potential for unfairness the North Dakota lay
judge procedure can foster is the unconfirmed report of an Indian
defendant who was arrested by a city policeman for a driving of-
fense, and subsequently charged with resisting arrest because he
wanted the police to take his wife to a place of safety rather than
leaving her in the car. The defendant was tried by the municipal
judge over the telephone, and fined $50.00, with no advice as to his
rights ever given other than that the police desk sergeant asked
the defendant whether he was guilty or not. This case was reported-
ly retried on a subsequent date, resulting in a $10.00 fine.
This author does not wish to imply that injustices in the
conviction and sentence. Aff'd, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969); cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963
(1969). See also Justice Stewart's dissent In DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
The culrrent status of such work-off statutes will be heard by the Supreme Court. Wil-
liams v. Illinois, No. 1089, 38' U.S.L.W. 3267.
39. Winters v. Beck, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. dened, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-01 (1968).
41. NI. CENT. CODE § 40-18-01 (1968).
42. This comment is in no way intended to cast poor reflections on any city judge in
the state; however, the possibilities enunciated do seem possible, and in many cases prob-
able to the author.
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-19 (Supp. 1969).
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municipal courts will not result where only attorneys act as judges,
or that they will occur more in courts administered by a lay judge.
The point to be made is that the probability for reversible error
and prejudicial treatment as a point of law is perhaps greater in a
court presided over by a lay judge than with a professional, legally
trained judiciary.
The situation in the county justice courts is somewhat better
than the municipal court picture in that county justices are required
to be attorneys. 4 4 However, exceptions also exist to allow for lay
county justices. 45 It is to be noted, as previously referred to, that
provisions do exist for permissive appointment of counsel before
these courts, but quaere whether such right is made known to the
defendant, or whether he must request the assistance of counsel.
It is a miscarriage of justice when the defendant in a criminal
misdemeanor or city ordinance prosecution may be required to ap-
pear without the assistance of counsel, and yet the prosecution may
have at its disposal the services of a city or county attorney.
Granted, the right to appeal does exist,43 but this procedure
should be used to correct prejudicial errors which could not have
been avoided or were overlooked at the trial court. The defendant
should be entitled to all guarantees to a fair trial in all steps of
the criminal proceedings, not only at the appellate level.
The inadequacies of municipal courts in North Dakota were
recently pointed out by the senior district court judge in North Da-
kota, Eugene Burdick of the Fifth Judicial District. Judge Bur-
dick advocated abolition, or at least a reduction in the jurisdiction
of our municipal courts to improve the State's system of criminal
justice. 46
If it may be assumed that the position of the present Oregon
decision is eventually accepted by the North Dakota Supreme Court,
or the United States Supreme Court, the argument will be raised, as
it was in Washington, that such a system of procedural safeguards
will be too expensive for the state to absorb. 47 One proposal to meet
this objection would be the establishment of a public defender sys-
tem, in a cooperative city-county type program. While the scope
of this comment is too restrictive to go into detail regarding such a
program, it would seem that some system could be established in
the state to provide the requisite protection to allow the defendant
to at least face his accusers on equal terms. The Oregon Court
dismissed the prohibitive cost argument, and stated that the cost
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-18-02 (1970).
45. N.D. CENT.) CODE § 27-18-06 (1970).
46. Remarks by Judge Eugene Burdick, Fifth Judicial District of North Dakota, made
to a Conference of State Officers held in Grand Forks, North Dakota, on March 23, 1970.
Grand Forks Herald, March 23. 1970, at 1, col. 2 and at 91 col. 4.
47. Hendrix v. Seattle, -Wash. at-, 456 P.2d 4t 710 (1969).
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of providing counsel to indigent misdemeanants and city ordinance
violators would amount to about one-twentieth of the annual receipts
of the state and its municipalities from fines, ". . . a modest fee
for guaranteeing a fair trial in all criminal prosecutions." 4 The
Minnesota Court also recognized the practical difficulties involved
in providing counsel for indigent misdemeanants, and stated that
until the legislature could enact procedures to provide for such
counsel, perhaps the public defender could absorb the burden.49
Once the decision has been made by a state court to extend the
right to counsel beyond the "serious crime" classification, the most
difficult portion of the decision remains, that is where should
the line be drawn? Stevenson alluded to the position that the denial
of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail
sentence,50 implying that in no case can the right to counsel be
denied where a jail sentence is possible. In Borst, the Minnesota
Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to all indigent defend-
ants where the sentence may lead to incarceration in a penal in-
stitution. 1 The court specifically avoided the question of providing
counsel where only a fine could be imposed, although recognition
was given to Minnesota's work-off statute, 52 and it was stated that in
the event a person were jailed for failure to pay a fine, the rule
of the case should apply.53
The concurring opinion in Borst took a somewhat more relaxed
position and stated:
I would draw a different line for now and exclude from the
operation of the rule any violations of highway traffic regu-
lation statutes and those cases of violations of the criminal
code constituting misdemeanors where incarceration is only
the alternative punishment upon failure to pay the fine or to
comply with other conditions imposed by the court.54
The rationale for this determination is that a difference exists be-
tween confinement in the workhouse and imprisonment in the state
penitentiary. The concurrence felt that in cases of incarceration on
failure to pay the fine, while the accused may be indigent for the
purposes of hiring counsel, he may be able to pay a fine, thus the
key to the workhouse is really carried in the defendant's pocket. 55
48. Stevenson v. Holzman, ----Ore. at-, 458 P.2d at 419 (1969).
49. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d at R95 (1967).
50. Stevenson v. Holzman, -Ore. at-, 458 P.2d at 418 (1969).
51. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d at 894 (1967).
52. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 574.35 (1947); see also § 641.10 (Supp. 1970).
53. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d at 894 (1967).
54. Id. at 896.
55. Id. Based on a reasonably accepted fee schedule of $20.00 per hour, even a rela-
tively minor case requiring two hours of investigation and preparation, one appearance to
enter a plea, and a subsequent hearing, on the merits of the case, the attorney's fee could
easily amount to $100.00, This amount is more than most fines for moving traffic viola-
tions.
RECENT CASES
The reason for excluding traffic regulation offenses is that they
are commonly considered to be less serious transgressions, and
that a more summary disposition without the benefit of defense
counsel is not inherently unfair.5 6
A more liberal view as to where the line should be drawn to
provide counsel for indigent defendants was adopted in the James
decision.57 In James, the court started with the position that the
Sixth Amendment established the right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions, and that the application of the maxim ". . . de mini-
mis non curat lex, provides a lawful, logical, and practicable basis
for excluding trifling criminal prosecutions." 58 The opinion stated
that counsel should be provided where the loss of liberty for any
period would result, and for those offenses involving moral turpitude,
such as where a license revocation could deprive the licensee of his
livelihood, or where a defendant's intelligence, or the complexity of
the issues involved would render the proceedings inherently unfair.5 9
While this test seems to be sound at first glance, it really does
nothing more than to restore the old case-by-case test applied in
Betts.6 0
The court in James advocated extending, and not limiting the
right to counsel, pointing out that it is at the minor offense level
where the largest number of people confront the criminal justice
system. It is at this "working level" of criminal justice that respect
for law can be developed through fair treatment to all defendants.
This treatment can be guaranteed to be fair only through the
presence of counsel to insure that all standards and safeguards are
afforded to prevent the conviction of innocent defendants.6 '
As is evident from the foregoing comment, the point at which to
draw the line for granting the right to counsel to indigent misde-
meanants and municipal ordinance violators is not easy to establish.
This writer is convinced, however, that no matter how difficult the
task may be, and regardless of the fact that the United States Su-
preme Court has refused to draw the line,6 2 it is a definition which
must be established by the states, as did Oregon and Minnesota.
56. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d at 897 (1967); see also Junker, The
Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 431 WASH. L. R v. 685, 703 (1968).
57. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969); See also Note, 22 Sw. L J. (1968).
58. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 1969).
59. "For example, although no social stigma attaches to parking overtime, stigma does
attach to the offense of drunken driving or to hit-and-run drivers fleeing the scene of an
accident." Id.
60. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
61. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d at 335 (5th Cir. 1969).
62. See: Justice Harlan's concurrance in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 349 (1963),
w here he recognized that the state ocurts have failed to recognize the evolution of the
Betts principle, and in fact paid only lip service to such principle. Justice Harlan stipu-
lates that the full application of the special circumstances rule to all serious offenses does
nothing more than make explicit something foreshadowed in their decisions, and which
must now be made certain by the Supreme Court.
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This line may be drawn based on the Sixth Amendment as was
done in Stevenson, or by the approach taken in Borst, nevertheless,
an extension of the principle presented by Gideon appears necessary.
Regarding North Dakota law, it is apparent that the need exists
to provide some remedy for the accused indigent to insure that he
receives a fair and impartial trial, and is not subjected to a "kanga-
roo court". As for where the minimum right to counsel should be
established, this writer would favor a modified Minnesota approach
and provide the indigent defendants the right to counsel whenever
a jail sentence could be imposed, exclusive of minor traffic offenses.
However great the price may be, in this day of challenge and unrest
it must be insured that all levels of the judicial proceedings are as
fair and impartial as possible. One of the most appropriate means
of establishing a fair and impartial hearing for indigent municipal
ordinance violators is to provide them with their constitutionally
guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel at public expense, sub-
ject to the aforementioned limitations.*
JOHN C. LERVICK
* The reader's attention to this problem in North Dakota is directed to a
study of the Burleigh County North Dakota Bar Association, Providing Counsel
for the Indigent Accused A Regional Survey, (January 1, 1970). This study was
received by the University of North Dakota School of Law subsequent to the
completion of this comment. It is notable that the study recommends the adoption
of a form of public defender system within North Dakota.
